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In this paper, we propose a bank-based explanation for the decade-long Japanese 
slowdown following the asset price collapse in the early 1990s.  We start with the well-
known observation that most large Japanese banks were only able to comply with capital 
standards because regulators were lax in their inspections.  To facilitate this forbearance 
the banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise 
insolvent borrowers (that we call zombies). Thus, the normal competitive outcome 
whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share was thwarted.  Our 
model highlights the restructuring implications of the zombie problem.  The counterpart 
of the congestion created by the zombies is a reduction of the profits for healthy firms, 
which discourages their entry and investment.  In this context, even solvent banks will 
not find good lending opportunities. We confirm our story’s key predictions that zombie-
dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower 
productivity.  We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies 
depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the 







 This paper explores the role that misdirected bank lending played in prolonging 
the Japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early 1990s.  The investigation 
focuses on the widespread practice of Japanese banks of continuing to lend to otherwise 
insolvent firms. We document the prevalence of this forbearance lending and show its 
distorting effects on healthy firms that were competing with the impaired firms.   
 Hoshi (2000) was the first paper to call attention to this phenomenon and its 
ramifications have been partially explored by a number of observers of the Japanese 
economy.  There is agreement that the trigger was the large stock and land price declines 
that began in early 1990s: stock prices lost roughly 60% of their value from the 1989 
peak within three years, while commercial land prices fell by roughly 50% after their 
1992 peak over the next ten years.  These shocks impaired collateral values sufficiently 
that any banking system would have had tremendous problems adjusting.  But in Japan 
the political and regulatory response was to deny the existence of any problems and delay 
any serious reforms or restructuring of the banks.1  Aside from a couple of crisis periods 
when regulators were forced to recognize a few insolvencies and temporarily nationalize 
the offending banks, the banks were surprisingly unconstrained by the regulators.   
 The one exception to this rule is that banks had to comply (or appear to comply) 
with the international standards governing their minimum level of capital (the so-called 
Basle capital standards).  This meant that when banks wanted to call in a non-performing 
loan, they were likely to have to write off existing capital, which in turn pushed them up 
against the minimum capital levels.  The fear of falling below the capital standards led 
many banks to continue to extend credit to insolvent borrowers, gambling that somehow 
these firms would recover or that the government would bail them out.2  Failing to 
                                                 
1 For instance, in 1997, at least 5 years after the problem of non-performing loans was recognized, the 
Ministry of Finance was insisting that no public money would be needed to assist the banks. In February 
1999 then Vice Minister of International Finance, Eisuke Sakakibara, was quoted as saying that the 
Japanese banking problems “would be over within a matter of weeks.”  As late as 2002, the Financial 
Services Agency claimed that Japanese banks were well capitalized and no more public money would be 
necessary. 
2 The banks also tried to raise capital by issuing more shares and subordinated debt, as Ito and Sasaki 
(2002) document.  When the banks raised new capital, however, almost all came from either related firms 
(most notably life insurance companies) that are dependent on the banks for their financing, or the 
 3
rollover the loans also would have sparked public criticism that banks were worsening 
the recession by denying credit to needy corporations.  Indeed, the government also 
encouraged the banks to increase their lending to small and medium sized firms to ease 
the apparent “credit crunch” especially after 1998.3  The continued financing, or “ever-
greening,” can therefore be seen as a rational response by the banks to these various 
pressures.  
 A simple measure of the ever-greening is shown in Figure 1, which reports the 
percentage of bank customers that received subsidized bank credit.  We defer the details 
of how the firms are identified until the next section, but for now all that matters is that 
the universe of firms considered here is all publicly traded manufacturing, construction, 
real estate, retail, wholesale (excluding nine general trading companies) and service 
sector firms.   The top panel of the figure shows roughly 30% of these firms were on life 
support from the banks in the early 2000s.  The lower panel, which shows comparable 
asset weighted figures, suggests that about 15% of assets reside in these firms.  As these 
figures show, these percentages were much lower in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 By keeping these unprofitable borrowers (that we call “zombies”) alive, the banks 
allowed them to distort competition throughout the rest of the economy.  The zombies’ 
distortions came in many ways, including depressing market prices for their products, 
raising market wages by hanging on to the workers whose productivity at the current 
firms declined and, more generally, congesting the markets where they participated.  
Effectively the growing government liability that came from guaranteeing the deposits of 
banks that supported the zombies served as a very inefficient program to sustain 
employment.  Thus, the normal competitive outcome whereby the zombies would shed 
workers and lose market share was thwarted.4  More importantly, the low prices and high 
wages reduce the profits that new and more productive firms could earn, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                 
government when banks received capital injections.  See Hoshi and Kashyap (2004, 2005) for more on this 
“double-gearing” between banking and life insurance sectors.   
3 Subsequently when the Long-Term Credit Bank was returned to private ownership, a condition for the 
sale was the new owners would maintain lending to small and medium borrowers.  The new owners 
tightened credit standards and the government pressured them to continue supplying funds, see Tett (2003) 
for details. 
4 See Ahearne and Shinada (2004) for some direct evidence suggesting that inefficient firms in the non-
manufacturing sector gained market share in Japan in the 1990s. See also Kim (2004) and Restuccia and 
Rogerson (2003) for attempts to quantify the size of these types of distortions.  
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discouraging their entry and investment.  In addition, even solvent banks saw no 
particularly good lending opportunities in Japan. 
 In the remainder of the paper we document and formalize this story.  In the next 
section, we describe the construction of our zombie measure.  There are a number of 
potential proxies that could be used to identify zombies.  As we explain, however, 
measurement problems confound most of these alternatives.   
 Having measured the extent of zombies, we then model their effects.  The model 
is a standard variant of the type that is studied in the literature on creative destruction. It 
is designed to contrast the adjustment of an industry to a negative shock with and without 
the presence of zombies. We model the presence of zombies as a constraint on the natural 
surge in destruction that would arise in the wake of an unfavorable technological, demand, 
or credit shock. The main effect of that constraint is that job creation must slow 
sufficiently to re-equilibrate the economy.  This means that during the adjustment the 
economy is characterized by what Caballero and Hammour (1998, 2000) have called 
“sclerosis” — the preservation of production units that would not be saved without the 
banks’ subsidies— and the associated “scrambling” — the retention of firms and projects 
that are less productive than some of those that do not enter or are not implemented due 
to the congestion caused by the zombies. 
 In the fourth section of the paper, we assess the main aggregate implications of 
the model.  In particular, we study the interaction between the percentage of zombies in 
the economy and the amount of restructuring, both over time and across different sectors.  
We find that the rise of the zombies has been associated with falling levels of aggregate 
restructuring, with job creation being especially depressed in the parts of the economy 
with the most zombies firms.  We then explore the impact of zombies on sectoral 
performance measures.  We find that the prevalence of zombies lowers productivity. 
  In section 5 we analyze firm-level data to directly look for congestion effects of 
the zombies on non-zombie firms’ behavior.  We find that investment and employment 
growth for healthy firms falls as the percentage of zombies in their industry rises.  
Moreover, the gap in productivity between zombie and non-zombie firms rises as the 
percentage of zombies rises.  Most strikingly, the presence of the zombies depresses 
activity the most for the fastest growing healthy firms. All of these findings are consistent 
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with the predictions that zombies crowd the market and that the congestion has real 
effects on the healthy firms in the economy.  Simple extrapolations using our regression 
coefficients suggest that cumulative size of the distortions (in terms of investment, or 
employment) is substantial.  
 In the final section of the paper we conclude by summarizing our results and 
discussing the implications of our findings for Japan’s outlook. 
 
2. Identifying zombies 
 
 Our story can be divided into two parts.  First, the banks misallocated credit by 
supporting zombie firms.  Second, the existence of zombie firms interfered with the 
process of creative destruction and stifled growth.  Our measure of zombie should not 
only capture the misallocation of credit but also be useful in testing the effect of zombies 
on corporate profitability and growth. 
 
2.1 Defining Zombies 
There is a growing literature examining the potential misallocation of bank credit 
in Japan (see Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) for a survey).   Much of the evidence is 
indirect.  For instance, several papers (including Hoshi (2000), Fukao (2000), Hosono 
and Sakuragawa (2003), Sasaki (2004)) study the distribution of loans across industries 
and note that underperforming industries like real estate or construction received more 
bank credit than other sectors that were performing better (such as manufacturing).5   
 Peek and Rosengren (2005) offer the most direct and systematic study to date on 
the potential misallocation of bank credit.  They find that bank credit to poor performing 
firms often increased between 1993 and 1999.  These firms’ main banks are more likely 
to lend to the firms than other banks dealing with these firms when the firm’s profitability 
                                                 
5 Other indirect evidence comes from studies such as Smith (2003), Schaede (2005) and Jerram (2004) that 
document that loan rates in Japan do not appear to be high enough to reflect the riskiness of the loans.   
Sakai, Uesugi and Watanabe (2005), however, show that poorly performing firms (measured by operating 
profits or net worth) still pay higher bank loan rates and are more likely to exit compared with better 
performing firms, at least for small firms.  Finally, see also Hamao, Mei and Xu  (forthcoming) who show 
that firm-level equity returns became less volatile during the 1990s and argue that this is likely due to a lack 
of restructuring in the economy. 
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is declining.  This pattern of perverse credit allocation is more likely when the bank’s 
own balance sheet is weak or when the borrower is a keiretsu affiliate.  Importantly, non-
affiliated banks do not show this pattern.    
 We depart from past studies by trying to identify zombies by classifying firms 
only based on our assessment of whether they are receiving subsidized credit, and not by 
looking at their productivity or profitability.  This strategy permits us to evaluate the 
effect of zombies on the economy.  If instead we were to define zombies based on their 
operating characteristics, then almost by definition industries dominated by zombie firms 
would have low profitability, and likely also have low growth.  Rather than hard-wiring 
this correlation, we want to test for it.    
 The challenge for our approach is to use publicly available information to 
determine which firms are receiving subsidized credit: banks and their borrowers have 
little incentive to reveal that a loan is miss-priced.  Because of the myriad of ways in 
which banks could transfer resources to their clients, there are many ways that we could 
attempt to measure subsidies.  To get some guidance we used the Nikkei Telecom 21 to 
search the four newspapers published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Nikkei Kin’yū Shimbun, Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, Nikkei Ryūtsū Shimbun) 
between January 1990 and May 2004 for all news articles containing the words “financial 
assistance” and either “management reconstruction plan” or (“corporation” and 
“reconstruction”).6  The summary of our findings are given in Table 1.  
  Our search uncovers 120 separate cases.  In most of them there were multiple 
types of assistance that were included.   As the table shows, between interest rate 
concessions, debt-equity swaps, debt forgiveness, and moratoriums on loan principal or 
interest, most of these packages involve reductions in interest payments or outright debt 
forgiveness by the troubled firms.7      
 The decision by a bank to restructure the loans to distressed companies in these 
ways, rather than just rolling over the loans, helps reduce the required capital needed by 
the bank.  Without such restructuring, banks would be forced to classify the loans to 
                                                 
6 The Japanese phrases were Kin’yu Shien AND (Keiei Saiken Keikaku OR (Kigyo AND Saiken)). 
 
7 These patterns are consistent with the claim by Tett and Ibison (2001) that almost one-half of the public 
funds injected into the banking system in 1998 and 1999 were allowed to be passed on to troubled 
construction companies in the form of debt forgiveness. 
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those borrowers as “at risk”, which usually would require the banks to set aside 70% of 
the loan value as loan loss reserves.  With restructuring, the banks need only move the 
loans to the “special attention” category, which requires reserves of at most 15%. 
In light of the evidence in Table 1, we concentrate on credit assistance that 
involves a direct interest rate subsidy.  We proceed in three steps.  First, we calculate a 
hypothetical lower bound for interest payments (R*) that we expect only for the highest 
quality borrowers.  We then compare this lower bound to the observed interest payments.  
Finally, we make several econometric assumptions to use the observed difference 
between actual interest rate (r) and notional lower bound rate (r*) to infer cases where we 
believe subsidies are present.  
   
2.2 Detecting Zombies 
 






where ,i tBS , ,i tBL and ,i tBonds  are short-term bank loans (less than one year), long-term 
bank loans (more than one year), and total bonds outstanding (including convertible 
bonds (CBs) and warrant-attached bonds) respectively of firm i at the end of year t, and 
trs ,  trl , and rcbmin over the last 5 years, t are the average short-term prime rate in year t, the 
average long-term prime rate in year t, and the minimum observed coupon rate on any 
convertible corporate bond issued in the last five years before t. 
 This estimate for the lower bound reflects the data constraints we face.  In 
particular, all we know about the firms’ debt structure is the type of debt instrument 
(short-term bank borrowing, long-term borrowing that are due in one year and remaining 
long-term bank borrowing, bonds outstanding that are due in one year and remaining 
bonds outstanding, and commercial paper outstanding).  In other words, we do not know 
the exact interest rates on specific loans, bonds or commercial paper, nor do we know the 
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exact maturities of any of these obligations.  Finally, the interest payments we can 
measure include all interest, fee and discount expenses, including those related to trade 
credit. 
 The general principle guiding the choices we make is to select interest rates that 
are extremely advantageous for the borrower, so that R* is in fact less than what most 
firms would pay in the absence of subsidies.  For instance, by assuming that bond 
financing takes place at rcbmin over the last 5 years, t  we are assuming not only that firms 
borrow using convertible bonds (which carry lower interest rates due to the conversion 
option), but also that these bonds are issued when rates are at their lowest.   We provide 
additional discussion of the data choices used in constructing R* and the alternative 
approaches that we examined for robustness check in Appendix 1.   
 To categorize firms we compare the actual interest payments made by the firms 
(Ri,t) with our hypothetical lower bound.  We normalize the difference by the amount of 
total borrowing at the beginning of the period (Bi.t-1 = , 1i tBS − + , 1i tBL − + , 1i tBonds − +CPi,t-1), 
where CPi,t-1 is the amount of commercial paper outstanding for the firm i at the 
beginning of the period t, so that the units are comparable to interest rates.  Accordingly 





R  - R  
 
B i t i t
x r r≡ = − , as the interest rate gap.  This 
measure is “conservative” because we assume the minimum interest rates that are 
extremely advantageous to the firm and because the interest payment, Ri,t, includes  
interest expenses on items beyond our concept of total borrowing (such as interest 
expenses on trade credit). 
 Note that given our procedure to construct r* we will not be able to detect all 
types of subsidized lending.8  In particular, any type of assistance that lowers the current 
period’s interest payments can be detected: including debt forgiveness, interest rate 
concessions, debt for equity swaps, or moratoriums on interest rate payments, all of 
which appeared to be prevalent in the cases studied in Table 1.  On the other hand, if a 
                                                 
8 In addition to the cases studied below, Hoshi (2006) examines the potential problems that might arise 
from rapid changes in interest rates.  For example, if interest rates fell sharply and actual loan terms moved 
as well, then our gap variable could be misleading about the prevalence of subsidized loans.  He constructs 
an alternative measure (that would be more robust to within year interest rate changes) and concludes that 
this sort of problem does not appear to be quantitatively important.  
 9
bank makes new loans to a firm at normal interest rates that are then used to pay off past 
loans, then our gap variable will not capture the subsidy.  Likewise, if a bank buys other 
assets from a client at overly generous prices our proxy will not detect the assistance.  
 We explore two strategies for identifying the set of zombie firms from the 
calculated interest rate gaps.  Our baseline procedure classifies a firm i as a zombie for 
year t whenever its interest rate gap is negative (xit < 0).   The justification for this 
strategy is the conservative philosophy underlying the construction of r*.  If r* is a 
perfectly measured lower bound, then only a firm that receives a subsidy can have a 
negative gap.  However, the problem of labeling a firm with xit just above zero as non-
zombie remains even under this perfect scenario. 
 Thus we resort to a second approach, which is more robust to misclassification of 
non-zombies. In this second approach we assume that the set of zombies is a “fuzzy” set.  
In the classical set theory, an element either belongs or does not belong to a particular set 
so that a 0-1 indicator function can be used to define a subset.  In contrast, in fuzzy set 
theory an element can belong to a particular subset to a certain degree, so that the 
indicator function can take any value in the interval [0, 1].   When the images of the 
indicator function are confined to {0, 1}, a set defined by the indicator function is called 
a “crisp” set.  Using this terminology, our first approach assumes the set of zombies is 
“crisp.”  Our second approach, on the other hand, assumes the set is “fuzzy,” allowing 
some firms to be more-or-less zombie-like.9 
 The indicator function that defines a fuzzy subset is called “membership 
function,” which we assume to be (for the set of zombie firms): 
1
2




( ; , ) if where 0
0 if 
x d
d xz x d d d x d d d
d d
x d
⎧ <⎪ −⎪= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤⎨ −⎪⎪ >⎩
   ( 1 ) 
The shape of the membership function is determined by the two parameters, d1 and d2.  
Figure 2 shows this membership function along with the indicator function implicit in our 
first approach.  It is easy to see the second approach degenerates to our first approach 
when d1 and d2 are both zero. 
                                                 
9 See Nguyen and Walker (2006) for an introduction to the fuzzy set theory. 
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 The second approach is appealing given the fuzzy nature of the concept of 
“zombie firms.”  These are defined to be those firms that receive sufficient financial help 
from their creditors to survive in spite of their poor profitability.  It is inherently difficult 
to specify how much financial help is considered to be sufficient, even if we had access 
to much more information than we do about individual firms. Our fuzzy approach 
acknowledges this limitation and assigns numbers between 0 and 1 to those firms whose 
zombie status is ambiguous. 
 Given the asymmetry (toward conservatism) inherent in the construction of r*, we 
assume that d1 is closer to zero than d2.  In what follows we show results for (d1, d2) = (0, 
50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp), where bp stands for basis points.  Thus, in the first 
case, we assume a firm with xit below zero is a definite zombie and a firm with xit above 
50 basis points is definitely a non-zombie: any firm with xit between zero and 50 basis 
points has “zombiness” between 0 and 1.   
 
 
2.3 Quantifying the prevalence of zombies  
  
 Figure 1 shows the aggregate estimate of the percentage of zombies using our 
baseline procedure.  As mentioned earlier, treating all firms equally we see that the 
percentage of zombies hovered between 5 and 15 percent up until 1993 and then rose 
sharply over the mid 1990s so that the zombie percentage was above 25 percent for every 
year after 1994.  In terms of the congestion spillovers, a size weighted measure of 
zombies is likely to be more important.   Weighting firms by their assets we see the same 
general pattern but with the overall percentage being lower, closer to 15 percent in the 
latter part of the sample.   
 We view the cross-sectional prevalence of zombies as another way to assess the 
plausibility of our definition.  To conduct this assessment, we aggregated the data used in 
Figure 1 into five industry groups covering manufacturing, construction, real estate, retail 
and wholesale (other than the nine largest general trading companies), and services – 
recall that all the firms included here are publicly traded. The zombie index for an 
industry is constructed by calculating the share of total assets held by the zombie firms – 
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and for the remainder of the paper we concentrate on asset weighted zombie indices.  In 
addition to showing the industry distribution, we also compute the zombie percentages 
implied by our second procedure with (d1, d2) = (0, 50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp).   
Figure 3 shows the zombie index for each industry from 1981 to 2002.  We draw 
three main conclusions from these graphs.  Starting with the upper left hand panel that 
shows the data for the entire sample, first notice that the crisp zombie measure (our 
baseline case) and the two fuzzy measures share similar time series movements (with the 
correlation between the crisp measure and the two fuzzy measures exceeding 0.99). 
Second, the other five panels show that the proportion of zombie firms increased in the 
late 1990s in every industry.  The third key conclusion is that the zombie problem was 
more serious for non-manufacturing firms than for manufacturing firms.  In 
manufacturing, the crisp measure suggests that zombie index only rose from 3.11% 
(1981-1993 average) to 9.58% (1996-2002 average).  In the construction industry, 
however, the measure increased from 4.47% (1981-1993 average) to 20.35% (1996-2002 
average).  Similar large increases occurred for the wholesale and retail, services, and real 
estate industries.  
There are a variety of potential explanations for these cross-sectional differences.  
For instance, Japanese manufacturing firms face global competition and thus could not 
easily be protected without prohibitively large subsidies.  For example, many of the 
troubled Japanese automakers were taken over by foreign firms rather than rescued by 
their banks during the 1990s.  In contrast, there is very little foreign competition in the 
other four industries.  
A second important factor was the nature of the shocks hitting the different 
sectors.  For instance, the construction and real estate industries were forced to deal with 
the huge run-up and subsequent collapse of land prices mentioned earlier.  Thus, the 
adjustment for these industries was likely to be more wrenching than for the other sectors. 
But the most important point about the differences shown in Figure 3 is that they 
confirm the conventional wisdom that bank lending distortions were not equal across 
sectors and that the problems were less acute in manufacturing – see Sekine et al (2003) 
for further discussion.  Thus, regardless of which explanation one favors as to why this 
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might be the case, we view it as particularly reassuring that our zombie index confirms 
this conventional view. 
 Figure 4, our last plausibility check, shows the asset weighted percentages of 
zombies for the firms that are above and below the median profit rate for their industry. 
To keep the graphs readable we show only the crisp measures, but the other measures 
show similar patterns.   In manufacturing the differences are not very noticeable, with 
slightly fewer high profit firms being labeled as zombies.  In the remaining industries, 
particularly in real estate and construction, it appears that our measure of zombies is 
identifying firms that are systematically less profitable than the non-zombies, particularly 
from the mid-1990s onward.   
 
 
3. A model of the effect of zombie firms on restructuring 
 
 To analyze the effect of zombies we study a very simple environment that 
involves entry and exit decisions of both incumbent firms and potential new firms, which 
we later extend to analyze expansion and contraction decisions of existing firms. As a 
benchmark we start with a normal environment where all decisions are based purely on 
the operating profits from running a firm.  We then contrast that environment to one 
where some incumbent firms (for an unspecified reason) receive a subsidy that allows 
them to remain in business despite negative operating profits. 
 
 
3.1 The Environment 
 
 The essential points of interest can be seen in a model where time is discrete (and 
indexed by t ). A (representative) period t  starts with a mass tm  of existing production 
units.  The productivity of the incumbents varies over time and the current level of 
productivity for firm i in year t, oity , is: 
 
= + ∈o oit ity A  
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where ∈oit  is an idiosyncratic shock that is distributed uniformly on the unit interval. The 
main predictions from this model do not depend on the persistence of the productivity 
shocks, so we assume these shocks are i.i.d.   
In addition to the incumbents, there are also a set of potential entrants and we 
normalize their mass to be ½.  The potential entrants each draw a productivity level, nity , 
before deciding whether to enter or not.  The productivity for ith potential new firm in 
year t is: 
 
= + + ∈n nit ity A B  
 
with > 0B  and ∈nit  distributed uniformly on the unit interval. The shock ∈nit is again 
assumed to have no persistence.  These assumptions imply that on average the potential 
new firms will be more productive (and more profitable) than the incumbents (for one 
period only, then they become incumbents as well).  However, we also assume that there 
is an entry cost, κ > 0 , that they must pay to start up.  
Finally, both new and old units must incur a cost ( )tp N  in order to produce, 
where tN  represents the number of production units in operation at time t , i.e., the sum 
of the existing units that do not exit and new entrants. The cost ( )p N  is increasing with 
respect to N and captures any scarce input such as land, labor or capital.  Indeed p(N)  
captures any reduction in profits due to congestion or competition.10  For our purposes, 
all the predictions we emphasize will hold as long as ( )p N is a strictly increasing 
continuous function of N.  For simplicity, we adopt the  linear function: 
 
μ= +( ) .t tp N N  
 
                                                 
10 For example, we can motivate p(N) as the reduction in profits due to competition in the output market.  
Suppose the price of output is given by D-1(N), a decreasing function of N, and that  the cost of production 
for each production unit is a constant, C.  Under our assumption on  productivity, an incumbent decides to 
stay in the market (and a potential entrant decides to enter the market) if D-1(N)(A+ε)-C > 0, or 
equivalently, A+ε-C/ D-1(N) > 0.  In this specific example, p(N) is C/ D-1(N), which is increasing with 
respect to N. 
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where the intercept μ is potential shift variable that captures cost changes and other profit 
shocks. 
 
3.2  Decisions  
 
 This basic model will quickly generate complicated dynamics because the 
existing firms have paid the entry cost and thus face a different decision problem than the 
new firms for which the entry cost is not sunk.  These dynamics are not essential for our 
main predictions, so we assume that κ=B .  In this case, the exit decision by incumbents 
and the entry decision by potential entrants become fully myopic. Since productivity 
shocks are i.i.d. and there is no advantage from being an insider (the sunk cost of 
investment is exactly offset by a lower productivity), both types of units look only at 
current profits to decide whether to operate. 
Letting oy  and ny  denote the reservation productivity of incumbents and 
potential entrants, respectively, we have:  
 
− =( ) 0,oy p N  
 
κ− − =( ) 0.ny p N  
 




⎡ ⎤= − = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫1( )1 ( ( ) ),tt t t tp N AD m di m p N A         (2) 
 
−= = − −∫1( )1 1 (1 ( ( ) )).2 2tt tp N AH di p N A        (3) 
 
Adding units created to the surviving incumbents yields the total number of units 
operating at timet :  
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( )( )⎛ ⎞= + − = + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠1 1 ( ) .2t t t t t tN H m D m p N A    (4) 
 
3.3 Equilibrium and Steady State 
 
 We can now solve for the steady state of the normal version of the economy. The 
first step is to replace μ+( ) with p N N   in (4). The notation is simplified if we define S 
to be composite shock that is equal to A-μ . Note that a lower S indicates either higher 
costs (higher μ) or lower average productivity (smaller A).  This yields the equilibrium 
number of units:  
 










         (5) 
 
Given the total number of operating units, we can solve for equilibrium rates of 
destruction and creation by substituting (5) into (2) and (3):  









        (6) 
 







                     (7) 
 
The dynamics of this system are determined by: 
 
+ =1 .t tm N       (8) 
 
In steady state, the mass of incumbents remains constant at =ss ssm N , which 
requires that creation and destruction exactly offset each other or, equivalently, that 
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=t tm N . Using the latter condition and (5), yields a quadratic equation for ssm , which 
has a unique positive solution of: 






⎛ ⎞− + − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  
 
For small values of S, we can approximate the above by: 
 
≈ +1 2 .
2 3
ssm S  
 
In our subsequent analysis we will assume that the economy begins in a steady 
state and that the initial (pre-shock) value of S, S0, is 0. Given this normalization, the 
corresponding steady state will be = =0 0 1/2m N and = =0 0 1/4.H D  
 
3.4 A (permanent) Recession 
 
 We can now analyze the adjustment of the economy to a profit shock.  By 
construction the model treats aggregate productivity shifts, changes in A, and cost shocks, 
changes in μ, as equivalent.  So what follows does not depend on which of these occurs.  
We separate the discussion to distinguish between the short- and long-run impact of a 
decline in S from 0 10 to 0S S= <  (lower productivity or higher costs). By the “short-run” 
we mean for a fixed m = m0  = 1/2. By the “long-run,” on the other hand, we mean after m 
has adjusted to its new steady state value = +1 11/2 (2/3)m S . 
 
It is easy to see from (6) and (7) that in the short-run: 
 






                                                   (9) 
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That is, when S drops, creation falls and destruction rises, leading to a decline in N (see 
(4)).  In other words, in a normal economy, negative profit shocks are met with both 
increased exit by incumbents and reduced entry of new firms. 
Over time, the gap between destruction and creation reduces the number of 
incumbents (recall from (4) and (8) that ΔN=H-D), which lowers the cost of inputs 
(p(N)) and eventually puts an end to the gap between creation and destruction caused by 
the negative shock.  
Across steady states, we have that: 
 








The number of production units falls beyond the initial impact as time goes by and the 
positive gap between destruction and creation closes gradually. Note that since N falls 
less than one for one with S, the long run reduction in the input cost due to reduced 
competition is not enough to offset the direct effect of a lower S on creation. That is, 
creation falls in the long run.   And since creation and destruction are equal in the long 
run, the initial surge in destruction is temporary and ultimately destruction also ends up 




Suppose now that “banks” choose to protect incumbents from the initial surge in 
destruction brought about by the decline in S.  There are a variety of ways that this might 
be accomplished. We assume that the banks do this by providing just enough resources to 
the additional units that would have been scrapped so that they can remain in operation.  
                                                 
11 This long run level effect is undone when creation and destruction are measured as ratios over N, as is 
often done in empirical work. However, the qualitative aspects of the short run results are preserved since 




With this assumption, a firm that does receive a subsidy is indifferent to exiting and 
operating, and thus entry and exit decisions remain myopic. 
The maximum short run effect would be on impact, when the normal economy 
would show a spike in destruction (see (5)).  Under the zombie-subsidy assumption, we 
have that:  
 
+ = =0 0 1 .4
zD D  
 
The post-shock destruction remains the same as the pre-shock level.  The lack of 
adjustment on the destruction margin means that now creation must do all the adjustment: 
 
+ + += + − = +0 0 0 01/4 1/4.z z zN H m H    (10) 
 
Replacing this expression into (3), we can solve out for H:  
+ = +0 1 ,4 3
z SH  
 
This can be compared to the impact change in creation that occurs in the absence of 
zombies.  Doing so, we see: 
 
+ +∂ ∂= > =∂ ∂






That is, a decline in S has a much larger negative effect on creation in the presence of 
zombies.  This result is a robust feature of this type of model.  In particular, the same 
qualitative prediction would hold even if we had not suppressed the dynamics and had 
allowed persistence in the productivity shocks and a gap between entry costs and the 
productivity advantage of new firms.  Intuitively, this is the case because the adverse 
shock causes the labor market to clear with fewer people employed.  If destruction is 
suppressed, then the labor market clearing can only occur if job creation drops 
precipitously.  
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As Caballero and Hammour (1998, 2000) emphasize, both this “sclerosis” — the 
preservation of production units that would not be saved without the banks’ subsidies— 
and the associated “scrambling” — the retention of firms that are less productive than 
some of those that do not enter due to the congestion caused by the zombies – are robust 
implications of models of creative destruction when there are frictions against contracting. 
Compared with a normally functioning economy, we have shown the existence of 
zombies softens a negative shock’s impact on destruction and exacerbates its impact on 
creation.  What is the net effect on the number of firms?  It is straightforward to show: 
 
+ +∂ ∂= < =∂ ∂






That is, in response to a negative shock, N falls by less if there are zombies, which means 
that in the presence of zombies the reduced destruction is not fully matched by the 
additional drop in creation.    This is another intuitive and robust result.  This occurs 
because as job creation falls, the marginal entrant’s productivity rises. This high 
productivity allows the marginal entrant to operate despite the higher cost induced by 
(comparatively) larger N.   
A final important prediction of the model is the existence of a gap in profitability 
(net of entry costs) between the marginal entrant and the marginal incumbent when there 
are zombies.12 At impact, the destruction does not change, so that all the firms with 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks above the old threshold (1/2) remain in the industry.  
On the other hand, new entrants have to clear a higher threshold to compensate for the 
negative shock in S (which is only partially offset by the lower congestion following the 
negative shock).  As a result, the profitability of the marginal entrant is inefficiently 
higher than that of the marginal incumbent. The difference is given by: 
 
                                                 
12 Note that a wedge like this one also arises when there is a credit constraint on potential entrants but not 
on incumbents. In our model depressed entry results from the congestion due to zombies, and the gap is due 
to the subsidy to incumbents. Clearly, however, if the two mechanisms coexist they would reinforce each 
other, as congestion would reduce the collateral value of potential entrants.  
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In summary, the model makes two robust predictions.  The first is that the 
presence of zombies distorts the normal creation and destruction patterns to force larger 
creation adjustments following shocks to costs, productivity or profits.  Second, this 
distortion depresses productivity by preserving inefficient units at the expense of more 
productive potential entrants.   Accordingly, productivity will be lower when there are 
more zombies and as the zombies become more prevalent they will generate larger and 
larger distortions for the non-zombies.  
 By slightly re-interpreting what a “firm” means in our model, we can also see 
how the congestion effects caused by zombies will affect firms with different levels of 
profitability. Instead of assuming that a firm has only one project, suppose a firm consists 
of a set of projects, some of which are in place (incumbents) but the others have not been 
started (potential entrants).  Then, the above model can be re-interpreted as a model in 
which projects that are hit by productivity shocks every period and firms are deciding 
which projects to terminate (exits) and which new projects to start (entries).  
 Suppose further that firms differ in the quality of their projects.  In particular, 
some (high profitability) firms have many projects that are unusually profitable, but some 
other (low profitability) firms have only a few profitable projects.  Low profitability firms 
will not start many new projects, and the presence of zombies may not influence this very 
much.  Higher profitability firms, however, are more likely to have some new projects 
that become profitable each period that might be crowded out by the zombies.  This effect, 
however, could be non-monotonic because if a firm has a sufficiently good mix of 
projects, then its projects might still be worth initiating.  We will also test for whether 
higher quality firms are disproportionately harmed by the zombies, but (because of the 






4.  The effect of zombies on job creation, destruction and productivity 
 
 We use the two robust predictions of the model to guide our search for evidence 
that the zombie problem has affected Japan’s economic performance significantly. We 
begin by looking at aggregate cross-industry differences.  In the next section, we study 
firm-level data to characterize how the behavior of the non-zombie firms has been altered 
by the presence of zombie competitors. 
 Because our zombie indices exist from 1981 onwards, we start by calculating the 
average of the crisp zombie index for each industry from then until 1993 and compare 
that to the average for the late 1990s (1996-2002).  We use the differences in these two 
averages to correct for possible biases in the level of zombie index and any industry-
specific effects. It makes little difference as to how we define the pre-zombie period. In 
particular, the results we show would be very similar if we took the normal (non-zombie) 
period to be 1981 to 1990, or 1990 to 1993. Our evidence consists of relating creation, 
destruction, and productivity data to this change in the zombie index, in order to see if 
these measures are more distorted in the industries where zombie prevalence has 
increased the most.  
 Our most direct evidence on this point is in Figure 5, which plots the rate of job 
creation and destruction against the change in the zombie index.  We use the job flow 
measures constructed by Genda et al. (2003) as proxies for the concepts of entry and exit 
in our model.  Their measures are based on The Survey of Employment Trends, 
conducted by the Ministry of Welfare and Labor biannually on a large sample of 
establishments that employ five or more regular workers.  The series used for our 
analysis include not only the job creation (destruction) at the establishments that were 
included in the survey in both at the beginning and at the end of the year, but also the 
estimated job creation (and destruction) by new entrants (and the establishments that 
exited).  To control for the industry specific effects in job creation/destruction, we look at 
the difference between the average job creation (destruction) rate for the 1996-2000 
period and the average for the 1991-1993 period.  We are restricted to using the 1991—
93 data as a control because figures of Genda et al. start only in 1991 and we stop in 2000 
because that is the last year they cover. 
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 The top of Figure 5 shows that the job destruction rate in the late 1990s increased 
from that in the early 1990s in every industry, as we would expect to see following an 
unfavorable shock to the economy.13  More importantly, the graph shows that the surge in 
destruction was smaller in the industries where more zombies appeared.  Thus, as we 
expected, the presence of zombies slows down job destruction. 
 The second panel of Figure 5 shows that the presence of zombies depresses job 
creation.  Creation declined more in the industries that experienced sharper zombie 
growth.  In manufacturing, which suffered the least from the zombie problem, job 
creation hardly changed from the early 1990s to the late 1990s. In sharp contrast, job 
creation exhibits extensive declines in non-manufacturing sectors, particularly in the 
construction sector.   
 Of course not all sectors were equally affected by the Japanese crash in asset 
prices and the slowdown that followed it. For example, construction, having benefited 
disproportionately from the boom years, probably also was hit by the largest recessionary 
shock during the 1990s. A large shock naturally raises job destruction and depresses job 
creation further. Despite this source of (for us, unobserved) heterogeneity, the general 
patterns we expected from job flows hold.  One way of controlling for the size of the 
shock is by checking whether in more zombie-affected sectors, the relative adjustment 
through job creation is larger. In this metric, it is quite clear from Figure 5 that job 
creation has borne a much larger share of the adjustment in construction than in 
manufacturing.   
 Our evidence on productivity distortions caused by the interest rate subsidies is 
given in Figure 6.  In the model, zombies are the low productivity units that would exit 
the market in the absence of help from the banks. Their presence lowers the industry’s 
average productivity both directly by continuing to operate and indirectly by deterring 
entry of more productive firms.  The productivity data here are from Miyagawa, Ito and 
Harada (2004) who study productivity growth in 22 industries.  Figure 6, which plots the 
average growth of the total factor productivity (TFP) from 1990 to 2000 against the 
                                                 
13 Our simple model assumes that the job destruction rate stays the same even after a negative shock in a 
zombie industry.  It is straightforward to relax this by assuming, for example, that 90% of zombies are 
rescued by banks.  None of the major results would change.  Job destruction would rise following a 
negative shock but not as much as it would under the normal environment. 
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change in the crisp zombie index, shows that the data are consistent with the model’s 
implication: the regression line in the figure confirms the visual impression that industries 
where zombies became more important were the ones where TFP growth was worst.14   
 
5. Firm-level zombie distortions 
 
 We read the evidence in Figures 5 and 6 as showing that zombies are distorting 
industry patterns of job creation and destruction, as well as productivity in the ways 
suggested by the model.  To test directly the model’s predictions, we next look at firm-
level data to see if the rising presence of zombies in the late 1990s had discernible effects 
on the healthy firms (which would suffer from the congestion created by the zombies).   
 The data we analyze are from the Nikkei Needs Financial dataset and are derived 
from income statements and balance sheets for firms listed on the first and second 
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The sample runs from 1981 to 2002, and it 
contains between 1,844 and 2,506 firms depending on the year. We concentrate on three 
variables: employment growth (measured by the number of full-time employees), the 
investment rate (defined as the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to beginning of 
year depreciable assets measured at book value), and a crude productivity proxy 
(computed as the log of sales minus 1/3 the log of capital minus 2/3 the log of 
employment).   In all the regressions reported below we dropped observations in the top 
and bottom 2.5% of the distribution of the dependent variable.  
 The simplest regression that we study is: 
 
ijt jt ijt jt ijt jt ijtActivity =   δ D + nonz  +  + nonz *Z   +                        (11)Zβ χ ϕ ε′  
 
where activity can be either the investment rate, the percentage change in employment, or 
our productivity proxy, Djt includes a set of annual indicator variables and a set of 
industry dummy variables, nonzijt is the probability that the firm is non-zombie, and Zjt is 
the percentage of industry assets residing in zombie firms.    
                                                 
14 Of course this correlation could arise because industries that had the worst shocks wound up with the 
most zombies.  We can disentangle these explanations by using firm-level data (see below).    
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 Because of the reduced form nature of both the regression equation and the 
modeling of the subsidies to the zombies, we do not attempt to interpret most of the 
coefficients in these regressions.  For instance, we include the year dummies to allow for 
unspecified aggregate shocks.  Likewise, we can imagine that the zombies’ subsidies are 
so large that they wind up investing more (or adding more workers) than the healthy 
firms; so we do not propose to test the theory by looking at the estimates for β, the 
coefficient for the non-zombies.  The one exception to this general principle is that for the 
productivity specification the model clearly predicts that non-zombies will have higher 
average productivity than zombies.     
 We instead focus on what we see as the novel prediction of the theory: that the 
rising zombie congestion should harm the non-zombies.  This prediction suggests that φ 
would be negative in the investment and employment regressions, and be positive in the 
productivity specification. Note that for the investment (employment) specification one 
might normally suspect that as the percentage of sick firms in the industry rises, the 
healthy firms would have more (relative to the sick ones) to gain from investing 
(expanding employment).  Thus, under normal circumstance there would be good reasons 
to expect φ to be positive rather than negative.   
 The main reason, other than ours, for finding negative φ is if the zombie 
percentage in the industry is somehow standing in for the overall (un)attractiveness of 
operating in the industry.  To this potential objection to our results we note two things.  
First, our definition of zombies, by virtue of only using interest rate payments, does not 
guarantee that growth opportunities are necessarily bad just because the zombie 
percentage is high. Second, in order to be consistent with our findings, the reaction to 
industry conditions must be different for zombies and non-zombies. In particular, non-
zombies must be more affected by an industry downturn than zombies for φ to come out 
negative.  Nonetheless, we seek to find other controls for business opportunities for the 
healthy firms to minimize this potential omitted variable bias.  Our main control to 
address this problem is to add current sales growth of each firm to the regression 
specification.   Thus, our alternative regression is: 
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where sijt is the growth rate of sales and the other variables are defined as in equation (11). 
 The coefficient π in (12) reveals an additional potential effect for the zombies.  If 
π is different from zero, then it implies that faster growing healthy firms and slower 
growing healthy firms are differentially affected by the presence of the zombies.  As 
mentioned earlier, a natural interpretation of the model suggests that the zombie 
distortions should be larger for the healthiest firms.  This would be the case if π < 0.   
 The second through fourth columns of Table 2 shows our estimates for equations 
(11) for the crisp zombie index. We draw three main conclusions from this simple 
specification.   First, as predicted by the theory, increases in percentages of zombie firms 
operating in an industry significantly reduces both investment and employment growth 
for the healthy firms in the industry.15  Our second finding, shown in column 4, is that the 
non-zombies have significantly higher productivity than the zombies.  Finally, the same 
column shows that the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies rises as the 
percentages of zombies in an industry rises.  These findings are consistent with the main 
predictions of our model. 
 As mentioned above, a competing explanation for the sign of the estimated φ in 
equation (11) is that the industry zombie percentage is an indirect measure of the growth 
opportunities in the industry, even for the healthy firms.  We address this concern by 
including controls that directly capture growth opportunities.  Columns 5 and 6 report 
estimates of equation (12), which include contemporaneous firm-specific sales growth as 
the potential growth proxy; for the investment specification, this type of accelerator 
specification generally performs quite well in a-theoretic horse-races among competing 
specifications (see Bernanke, Bohn and Reiss (1988)).    
                                                 
15 We ran a similar regression using investment rates for US firms covered in the Compustat database 
between 1995 and 2004.  In this regression φ was insignificantly different from zero.  The limited 
information on debt structure in Compustat no doubt introduces noise in zombie assignments and we did 
explore many alternatives to deal with this.  But this result suggests to us that there is not a mechanical 
reason to find that φ is significantly negative in this type of regression.  
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 In both columns the estimated coefficient on sales growth is highly significant, 
and in each equation the
2
R is nearly twice as high as that in the simpler specifications in 
columns 2 and 3.  In the specifications with sales growth, the estimated magnitude of the 
φ’s drops compared to the simpler specifications, but they remain negative and 
significant.  This indicates that while some of the interaction term’s significance may 
have been due to omitting proxies for growth opportunities, it is not the sole reason. 
 More substantively, in both of these specifications the estimated values for π are 
significantly negative.  This triple interaction suggests that the fastest growing non-
zombie (healthy) firms are the most impaired by the widespread presence of zombie 
firms in their industry. 
 In Appendix 2 we report a long list of robustness exercises, including fuzzy 
versions of equations (11) and (12), regressions omitting marginal zombies, as well as 
using different measures of minimum required interest rates in the construction of zombie 
indicators. While the level of significance and some of the point estimates vary across 
these multiple scenarios, the general flavor of the results does not.  More specifically, the 
estimates for φ tend to be negative and significant for the investment and employment 
regressions and positive and significant for the productivity regressions.  The estimates of 
π are more sensitive to the exact specification, and vary more for the employment 
regressions than for the investment specifications.  
 In the remainder of our discussion we attempt to quantify the impact of zombie 
firms on investment and employment growth of non-zombies.  We focus on the five non-
manufacturing industries, where our asset weighted measures of zombies were 
particularly high in the late 1990s.  For a typical non-zombie firm in each of these 
industries, we estimate how much more the non-zombie would have invested or increased 
employment if there had not been so many zombies in the industry.  We consider two 
alternative low zombies scenarios.  In “Case 1,” we assume that the zombie index stayed 
at its average value from 1981 through 1992 for each industry and calculate how much 
more a typical non-zombie firm would have invested (or employed) over the next ten 
years.16  In “Case 2,” we assume that the zombie index for the industry was the same as 
                                                 
16 More specifically, the investment (or employment) is estimated to have been higher than the actual level 
by ˆ ˆ( )( )actual zombie index alternative zombie indexχ ϕ+ − . 
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that for manufacturing for each year from 1993 to 2002.  We calculate the cumulative 
investment under these two scenarios and compare it to the typical amount of annual 
investment (defined as the average of the median rates) during this period.   For 
employment, we compare the cumulative decline attributable to the zombies with the 
typical annual change over the period (again defined as the average of the median rates).  
In all of these calculations we take the regression estimates based on the crisp zombie 
indices in Table 2, and ignore any feedback from industry equilibrium considerations.   
 Table 3 shows both investment and employment growth in non-zombie firms 
would have been higher in all these industries had there been less zombies.  In some 
industries, the difference is quite large.  For example, for the typical non-zombie firm in 
the wholesale industry the cumulative investment loss was about 12.1% of capital, which 
was slightly more than one year worth of investment during this period.   The 
employment growth of a typical non-zombie real estate developer would have been about 
higher by 3.0 percentage points at the end of the period if the zombie percentage had not 
risen (which can be compared to the average hiring in the industry of 0.62% per year).  
Overall, these effects are substantial.  
 In our main specifications we find the effect of zombie infestation on non-
zombies depends on the level of sales growth of the non-zombie (negative coefficient 
estimates on the three way interaction).  While these triple interaction results are less 
robust than the double interactions, it is still interesting to document the magnitude of the 
differential impacts suggested by our estimates. 
 Figure 7 uses estimates from Table 2 for equation (12) to infer the differential 
effect of varying degrees of zombie infestation for non-zombies with different levels of 
sales growth; formally, this amounts to studying 
2 Activity s
nonz Z
φ π∂ = +∂ ∂ .  The left panel 
shows the zombie distortion on investment is significantly worse for fast growing firms; 
the dotted lines in the graph show the 95 percent (asymptotic) confidence intervals.  Not 
only are these marginal effects significant, the overall quantitative impact is large.  For 
instance, for a firm with ten percent sales growth, if the industry zombie percentage were 
to increase from 0.1 to 0.2, investment would fall by 1.3 percentage points per year; if the 
firm instead had 15 percent annual sales growth, the investment drop would be 1.55 
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percentage points per year.  Given the median investment rate of 14.7% per year (1993-
2002) we view these effects as large. 
 The right panel in the figure presents an analogous calculation for employment.  
The marginal effects again are significant (for all cases where sales growth is above two 
percent per year).  For a firm with sales growth of ten percent per year, an increase in the 
zombie percentage from 0.1 to 0.2 would depress annual employment growth by 0.25 
percentage points per year.  Since employment growth for this sample of firms was 
approximately zero, the implied cumulative effect of the high level of zombies during the 
late 1990s is big.  
 Given the depressed condition of the economy between 1993 and 2002 it is not 
clear which benchmark to use in gauging the size of the effects.  Normally, we would 
have expected to find some firms with sales growth of 10 to 15 percent per year, but these 
firms are quite rare in Japan over this period.  Nonetheless, it appears that there were 
substantial distortions for the healthiest firms.  
 
6. Final Remarks 
  
 Let us now take stock and discuss the implications of our empirical findings.  
First, the mechanism we have highlighted compounds the problems caused by a 
traditional credit crunch.  Recall that the reduced form profit shock that we analyze in the 
model subsumes a simple credit crunch.  Thus, if a pure contraction in credit availability 
was all that was going on, the economy would be expected to behave like the normal 
benchmark case we analyze.  It follows that the evidence we presented to support the 
zombie model, also shows that a pure credit crunch explanation (a la Kitasaka and Ogawa 
(2000)) for the recent experience, while highly relevant, is insufficient.17 
 One key characteristic of our mechanism is that zombies create on-going 
distortions that lower job creation and industry productivity.  A straightforward extension 
                                                 
17  There are also other implications that we have not tested that could be further used to distinguish these 
two models.  For instance, the zombie model explains why the firms that do enter or expand need not have 
high values of Tobin’s Q – essentially because the zombie congestion costs lower their profitability.  In 
contrast, a standard credit crunch model would predict that these firms should be earning rents by virtue of 
being able to operate against reduced competition.   See Caballero and Hammour (2005) for a discussion of 
the channels through which financial factors may depress restructuring during recessions.  
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of the model would make long-run productivity growth endogenous. In this case the 
present value of the costs due to the suppression of restructuring generated by continuing 
forbearance with the zombies would greatly exceed calculation based only on the direct 
costs of subsidies. 
 Japanese regulators may have failed to recognize the large costs of allowing 
zombies to continue operating during the episode.  For example, the capital injections 
given to Japanese banks in the late 1990s did not recapitalize the banks sufficiently so 
that they no longer had an incentive to evergreen.    The forgone benefits that would have 
accrued had Japan returned at that point to having a normally functioning economy could 
have been large enough to justify a very generous transition policy package to the 
displaced workers that would have been released if the zombies were shuttered.18  
 Finally our description of the Japanese experience is similar to the diagnosis that 
has been used to describe the early phases of the transition of many former socialist 
economies to becoming market-oriented.  In these economies the depressing effects on 
the private sector of the continued operation of state-owned enterprises (typically funded 
by state owned banks) is often noted; discussions of the current situation in China would 
be the latest of these examples.  Also, note that the key to our mechanism is lack of 
restructuring, which may be also caused by legal bankruptcy procedures that protect 
debtors rather than by banks’ behavior.  For example, in the U.S. airline industry it is 
routinely asserted that the industry has been plagued because unprofitable carriers go 
bankrupt, yet they fail to exit the industry (see Wessel and Carey (2005)).  These cases 
suggest that the mechanism that we have sketched is not unique to Japan.19   
                                                 
18 The same reasoning applies to the question of whether the lack of liquidations in the U.S. airline industry 
raised or lowered the taxpayers’ costs of rationalizing the industry.  
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Appendix 1  
 
 The variable R* plays a critical role in our analysis.  In this appendix we provide 
some additional details on the construction of this variable and the other data used in the 
analysis.   
 In constructing R* our goal is to produce a plausible lower bound for what firms 
might pay to borrow.  For the portion of the interest payments coming from short term 
bank loans, which accounts for about 40% to 45% of total lending in our sample, we 
believe that this is straightforward because almost no loans are made at rates below the 
prime rate (once we take into account all the origination and other fees).  Thus, we view 
the use of the short term prime rate as relatively uncontroversial.20     
 Ideally, we would find an equally conservative assumption for handling long-term 
loans. It is quite likely that interest payment on a new long-term loan would be above the 
prime rate at the time the loan is originated.  Unfortunately, the available data on long-
term bank debt gives just the stock outstanding without information on the exact maturity 
of the loans.  So we assume that each firm’s long term loans have an average maturity of 
2.5 years and with one-fifth having been originated in each year for five years.  Five 
years corresponds to the average maturity of bank loans in the dataset of Smith (2003).  
This assumption implies that the right interest rate is an equally weighted average of the 
last five years of the long-term prime rates.  Thus, we calculate the minimum required 
interest payment on the long-term loans by multiplying the outstanding long-term loans 
of all maturities with the five year average of the long-term prime rates.    
 Turning to the non-bank financing, we know that during the 1990s, roughly 40% 
of interest paying debt was bonds and about 3% was commercial paper. Our measure of 
the required payment ignores the interest payments for commercial paper.  Given the 
limited importance of commercial paper financing and the low interest rates on the 
commercial paper for the 1990s, this is not likely to cause any serious problems for our 
analysis.  
                                                 
20 As alternative we instead computed a required rate that imposed a mark up over the London Interbank 
Borrowing (LIBOR) rate based on the average spreads reported in Smith (2003).  This approach produced 
similar results regarding the numbers of firms with negative interest rate gaps.   
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 For the remaining debt we assume that it was financed as advantageously as 
possible.  Specifically, we assume that bond financing is done with CBs (which by their 
nature have lower yields) and that firms were always able to time the issues so that the 
rate is the lowest within the last five years.  Implicitly, this presumes that the firms have 
perfect foresight and refinance their bonds every time there is a local trough in interest 
rates.  This assumption is almost surely going to understate the required payments on 
corporate debt.  For instance, from 1996 onwards this imputation procedure will assume 
that all bond financing is done at a zero interest rate.  By assuming very low required 
interest rates on bonds, the approach reduces the risk of our misclassifying credit worthy 
companies that enjoy extreme low bond rates in the public market as zombies.  On the 
other hand, the approach would increase the risk of failing to identify the zombies that 
pay interests on the bonds they issued in the past.  Thus, we can be confident that any 
firms that we label as zombies must be getting very favorable interest rates from their 
banks. Put differently, by assuming access to such low bond financing rates our 
classification scheme will pick out only the most egregious zombies that receive massive 
help from their banks.  
 Besides this baseline procedure we also explored several approaches.  One 
alternative centered on estimating the maturity structure of each firm each year. Here we 
just describe the calculation for long-term bank borrowing.  We estimate the maturity 
structure of bonds in the same way. 
We observe the total long-term bank borrowing for firm i at the end of accounting 
year t ( itBL ) and the long-term bank borrowing that comes due within 1 year ( 1itBL ).  Let 
itNBL  be the amount of new long-term bank loans that the firm i takes in during year t.  
We use the following equation to estimate itNBL : 
 { }1 1max 1 ,0it it it itNBL BL BL BL− −= − +  
Let ( )itBP n  denote the amount of long-term bank loans to firm i that was given in year t-
n and still outstanding at the end of t.  We assume the maximum maturity of long-term 
bank loans to be 10 years.  If NBL is available for all years in the past 10 years, we can 
estimate BP(n) recursively as follows. 
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If 1it nNBL − −  is not available for n ≥ n*, we stop the iteration at n = n* and assume that 
the remaining borrowings (if any) are uniformly distributed across different maturities.  
Formally, this implies: 
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The associated regression results are shown in Table A-3 (that we discuss in Appendix 2).  
 For bonds, we also adopted an extremely conservative approach that assumes the 
minimum required interest rate for bonds was zero for the entire sample period. This 
approach guarantees that any firms with a negative interest rate gap must be receiving 
unusually low interest rates on their bank borrowing.  The regressions associated with 
this classification scheme are shown in Table A-4 (and are almost identical to those 
shown in Table 2).  
The data for prime bank loan rates are taken from the Bank of Japan web site 
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/stat_f.htm).  The subscribers’ yields for convertible bonds 
are collected from various issues of Kin’yu Nenpo (Annual Report on Finance) published 
by the Ministry of Finance.  The remaining data we use for the regression analyses are 
taken from the Nikkei Needs Corporate Financial Database.  The data are annual, so for 
instance when we refer to 1993 data they are from a firm’s balance sheet and income 






 We checked the robustness of the significance of the estimated φ’s and π’s to 
several alternative measures of the required minimum interest rate r* and zombie indices. 
Table A-1 repeats the regressions from Table 2, using the fuzzy zombie indices with (d1, 
d2) = (0, 50bp) and (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp).   We draw three conclusions from this table.  
First, the estimates of φ and π are smaller than those in Table 2.  However, part of the 
difference can be explained by the fact that the industry zombie percentages are larger 
when we use the fuzzy zombie measures than when we use the crisp measures.  Second, 
and probably related, for the estimates of (11), the statistical significance of the estimates 
of φ is similar to those in Table 2; in other words, the declines in the size of the 
coefficients are accompanied by smaller standard errors, so that the t-statistics are similar.  
 When we add sales growth (and the associated interaction terms) to the equations 
the significance of both φ and π falls. Their estimated signs remain negative in all cases, 
but most of the coefficients are no longer significant.21  So this specification is less robust 
to this alternative measure of zombies. 
 We also estimated the regressions dropping the observations with xit between d1 
and d2 entirely.  Table A-2 shows the results.  The estimates of φ in the investment and 
employment growth equations are again negative and statistically significant in almost all 
the cases.  Indeed, the size of the coefficient is often higher when we drop the 
observations with xit close to zero.  For the productivity proxy, however, the estimated 
gap between the zombies and non-zombies (β in equation 11) rises substantially, while 
the estimated value of φ falls dramatically and becomes insignificant.  The result for the 
three-way interaction term (non-zombie dummy x sales growth x industry zombie 
percentage) is not robust to this change in specification, either, suggesting the result 
critically depends on the inclusion of the observations with xit close to zero. 
 We considered several other alternatives that are not reported since the results are 
so similar to those shown in Tables 2, A-1, and A-2.  In particular, the regressions in 
Tables 2, A-1 and A-2 consider only the post 1993 period, when the zombie percentages 
                                                 
21 We could in principle use a mixture of crisp and fuzzy assignments to separate the individual firm 
classifications and the industry zombie percentages.  We performed a few experiments of this type for 
employment growth and did not find any systematic ways in which the results were affected.   
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began to rise noticeably.   When we re-estimated the Table 2 regressions to include the 
1980s in the sample, the estimates for investment and employment growth remain 
unchanged, while those for productivity change.  The estimated gap between the zombies 
and non-zombies rises substantially, while the estimated value of φ falls sharply and 
becomes insignificant. 
 We also tried different definitions of non-zombies.  Specifically, we counted a 
firm as a non-zombie only if it is not classified as a zombie in two or three consecutive 
years. In both cases the estimates of φ continued to be significantly negative for the 
investment and employment regressions, and significantly positive for the productivity 
regression, but for one exception where the estimate of φ, while still negative, was not 
significant even at 20% level.  The estimates of π were never statistically significant with 
this alternative definition of non-zombies, although the point estimates remained negative. 
 This alternative way of defining non-zombies can be applied to the fuzzy zombie 
indices as well.  We did this by recoding the zombiness of each firm in each year to be 
the maximum of the z calculated using the equation (1) over the last two (or three) years.  
Thus, to be classified as a non-zombie for sure, a company has to have z = 0 for 2 (or 3) 
consecutive years.  The regression results did not differ much from those in Table A-2.  
The estimates of φ are statistically significant with expected signs in the regressions 
without the sales growth.  With sales growth, the estimates of π are not significant, and 
the estimates of φ often lose significance, although the point estimates remain negative. 
 Table A-3 shows the results using more detailed estimation of the maturity 
structure for long-term borrowings and bonds discussed in Appendix 1.  The coefficient 
estimates on the simple interaction term (non-zombie dummy times industry zombie 
percentage) are similar to those in Table 2 in all the specifications.  The standard errors 
are, however, sometimes larger, so that the estimates are statistically significant only at 
10%.  Under this alternative assumption about the maturity structure, the results for the 
three way interaction term (non-zombie dummy times sales growth times industry 
zombie percentage) disappear.  The coefficient estimates on the three way interaction in 
the last two columns are not significantly different from zero. 
 Finally, Table A-4 shows the regressions under alternative assumption that the 
minimum required interest rate on bonds is zero.  The results are essentially the same as 
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those in Table 2 except for the last column.  In the employment change equation with 
sales growth variables, the estimates of the interaction terms cease to be statistically 
significant, although the point estimates fall only by small amounts.   
 All in all, the results of these robustness exercises are consistent with those in the 
main text, although it is apparent that the precisions of some of our estimates suffer as we 
dilute the measures of zombism and increase their robustness to different measurement 
and classification errors. 
  
 

































Note: Percentages calculated as described in the text, with d1=d2=0 in equation 1. 











Figure 3: Cross-Industry Incidence of Asset Weighted Zombie Percentage for Crisp and Fuzzy Zombie Definitions 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fuzzy with (d1, d2) = (0, 50bp)
Fuzzy with (d1, d2) = (-25bp, 75bp)
 
 
Figure 4: Asset Weighted Zombie Percentages by Profitability 
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Search Results For News Articles Regarding Restructured Companies  
 
 
Total Hits for January 1990 through May 2004 1,196 
Of which, related to private sector companies in Japan 1,085 
Clear description of the content of “financial assistance” 
(excludes duplicate articles on the same case) 
120 
•  New loans 19 
•  Interest concessions （金利減免） 36 
•  Purchase of new shares （新株引き受け） 29 
•  Debt-Equity swaps 26 
•  Debt forgiveness  （債権放棄） 44 
•  Moratorium on loan principle （元本支払猶予） 11 
•  Moratorium on interest payments （利子支払猶予） 5 
 
Notes:  Search words: “Financial assistance” AND (“Management Reconstruction Plan” OR 
(“Corporation” and “Reconstruction”)); actual phrases were 金融支援 AND (経営再建計画 OR 
(企業 AND 再建)).       
 
Source:  Nikkei Telecom 21.  
Table 2 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Using Baseline Zombie Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable  I/K  ΔLog E Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 































































Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth 




Industry Zombie% * 
Sales Growth 




Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth  * Industry 
Zombie% 




2R  0.0537 0.0895 0.3599 0.1083 0.1700 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each 
regression is estimated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent 
variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimate.  
Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  Any firm with actual interest payments 
below the hypothetical minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-
zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry 
percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales 
growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to 
beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full 
time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.   
 
Table 3 
Cumulative Impact of Zombie Firms on Non-Zombies 
 
A. Cumulative investment losses (1993-2002) of the median non-zombie firm in the high 
zombies industries 
 
Industry Wholesale Retail Construction Real 
Estate 
Services 
Actual Average I/K: 
1993-2002 
0.1184 0.1871 0.1373 0.0920 0.2215 
Cumulative Lost I/K 
Case 1 
0.1206 0.0525 0.0833 0.0793 0.0842 
Cumulative Lost I/K 
Case 2 
0.0963 0.0399 0.0503 0.1117 0.1408 
 
“Actual Average I/K: 1993-2002” shows the actual average investment rate (I/K) of the median 
non-zombie firm in the industry for 1993-2002.  “Cumulative Lost I/K Case 1” shows the total 
amount of investment (I/K) of the typical non-zombie that was depressed during the period 
compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index had stayed at its 
average level for 1981-1992.  “Cumulative Lost I/K Case 2” shows the total amount of 
investment (I/K) of the typical non-zombie that was depressed during the period compared with 
the hypothetical case where the asset weighted zombie index of the industry was the same as that 
of manufacturing in each year from 1993 to 2002.  The coefficient estimates from the regression 
in the column 2 of Table 2 were used for the calculation. 
 
B. Cumulative employment change (1993-2002) of the median non-zombie firm in the high 
zombies industries 
Industry Wholesale Retail Construction Real Estate Services 
Average Actual 
Employment growth:  
1993-2002 
-0.0136 0.0015 -0.0043 0.0062 0.0134 
Cumulative lost 
employment -- Case 1 
0.0381 0.0190 0.0285 0.0301 0.0381 
Cumulative lost 
employment -- Case 2 
0.0303 0.0144 0.0172 0.0427 0.0641 
 
“Average Actual Employment Growth: 1993-2002” shows the actual average annual rate of 
change in the employment at the median non-zombie in the industry for 1993-2002.  
“Cumulative lost employment Case 1” shows the total rate of new hiring at the typical non-
zombie that was depressed during this period compared with the hypothetical case where the 
asset weighted zombie index had stayed at its average level for 1981-1992.  “Cumulative lost 
employment Case 2” shows the total rate of new hiring at the typical non-zombie that was 
depressed during the period compared with the hypothetical case where the asset weighted 
zombie index of the industry was the same as that of manufacturing in each year from 1993 to 




Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Using Fuzzy Zombie Indices 
 
Dependent Variable              I/K ΔLog E Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K ΔLog E 
{d1, d2} (in basis 
points) in eq. (1) 














































































































* Sales Growth 









Sales Growth  * 
Industry Zombie% 








2R  0.0556 0.0559 0.0897 0.0898 0.3631 0.3630 0.1096 0.1097 0.1705 0.1707 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  The zombie probabilities are calculated as described in the text using 
equation (1).  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry 
assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to 
beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full time employees.  K is the book value of 
depreciable assets.  Sample period is 1993 to 2002.  
Table A-2 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Excluding observations with the interest rate gap close to zero 
 
Dependent Variable              I/K ΔLog E Log Sales –  ⅔ Log E 
–  ⅓ Log K 
I/K ΔLog E 
Range of excluded 
obs (in basis points) 
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Sales Growth  * 
Industry Zombie% 








2R  0.0502 0.0457 0.0858 0.0792 0.3652 0.3595 0.1099 0.1086 0.1681 0.1637 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each regression is estimated after trimming the top 
and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient 
estimate.  Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  Any firm with actual interest payments below the hypothetical minimum is 
considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are used 
throughout.   The industry percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales growth is the log 
difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book 
value).  E is the total number of full time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.  Sample period is 1993 to 2002.  
Table A-3 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Using Estimated Maturity Structure for Long-term Borrowings and Bonds 
 
Dependent Variable  I/K  ΔLog E Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 



















































Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth 




Industry Zombie% * 
Sales Growth 




Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth  * Industry 
Zombie% 




2R  0.0521 0.0897 0.3614 0.1075 0.1704 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each 
regression is estimated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent 
variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimate.  
Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  Any firm with actual interest payments 
below the hypothetical minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-
zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry 
percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales 
growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to 
beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full 
time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.   
Table A-4 
Impact of Zombie Firms on the Investment, Employment and Productivity of Non-Zombies 
Assuming Zero for the Minimum Required Interest Rate on Bonds 
 
Dependent Variable  I/K  ΔLog E Log Sales  
–  ⅔ Log E  
–  ⅓ Log K 



















































Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth 




Industry Zombie% * 
Sales Growth 




Non-Zombie * Sales 
Growth  * 
IndustryZombie% 




2R  0.0543 0.0896 0.3599 0.1084 0.1699 
 
The sample consists of between 1,844 and 2,506 publicly traded firms (depending on the year).  Each 
regression is estimated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5% of observations (based on the dependent 
variable).  White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimate.  
Industry and year dummies are also included in each regression.  Any firm with actual interest payments 
below the hypothetical minimum is considered a zombie and any firm where this is not true is a non-
zombie (d1=d2=0 in equation (1)).  Two digit industry classifications are used throughout.   The industry 
percentages for zombies are based on the share of total industry assets residing in zombie firms.  Sales 
growth is the log difference of each firm’s sales.  I/K is the ratio of investment in depreciable assets to 
beginning of period stock of depreciable assets (measured at book value).  E is the total number of full 
time employees.  K is the book value of depreciable assets.   
 
